1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

The existence of various cases of major corporate failures, such as WorldCom, Enron, and Satyam (often called "Enron India"), has caused considerable concern among investors and regulators. To alleviate these concerns and provide investors with increased confidence in financial investments, authorities have introduced initiatives to improve internal control structures of corporations. In Indonesia, this process started in 2000, with the introduction of the Code for Good Corporate Governance issued by the National Committee on Corporate Governance. A subsequent version was issued in 2006 promoting the voluntary establishment of certain board committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration, risk policy and corporate governance committees.

The most recent edition of the Indonesian Corporate Governance Manual, issued in June 2018, states that listed companies "must have" audit, nomination and remuneration committees. This shift in focus from voluntary formation of board committees to mandatory formation is interesting, as little to no research has been conducted in Indonesia about the effectiveness of such committees. This study helps to address this issue by examining the role of the remuneration committee on the remuneration practices of senior company officers and its associated effect on firm performance.

Indonesia is a market with a somewhat unique or unusual board structure. Based on the Financial Services Authority Regulation No. 33 /POJK.04/2014, Indonesian companies adhere to a two-tier board system. Indonesian companies have both a board of commissioners and a board of directors. The board of commissioners functions in a similar way to a board of directors in other countries. Whereas, the board of directors in Indonesia is similar to the top management team in other countries. Board committees are overseen by the board of commissioners in Indonesia, just as they would be overseen by a board of directors in other markets. To maintain consistency with the terminology used in other markets, we refer to boards of commissioners as boards of directors, and boards of directors as executives in the remainder of this paper.

In Indonesia, nomination and remuneration committees are formed to manage the compensation of the board of directors and executives. Based on the Financial Services Authority Regulation 34/POJK.04/2014, it is explained that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee is a committee formed by and responsible to the board of directors in its functions and duties. Furthermore, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee must consist of three members, where the chairperson of the committee must be an independent member of the board of directors, while the committee members may come from the board of directors, parties from outside the company, and those who hold managerial positions under the executive in charge of human resources. Thus, Nomination and Remuneration Committees are expected to support the mechanism of good corporate governance.

Agency theory argues that corporate governance mechanisms must be effectively implemented as a form of good internal control to reduce information gaps and possible agency costs. Based on agency theory, the board of directors is believed to be an important element of corporate governance. The board of directors is responsible for monitoring, controlling and linking companies with their external environment ([@bib4]). The board of directors can then delegate some of its powers to specific committees responsible for a particular area, where the committee members are specialized.

Specialist committees are important corporate governance mechanisms to protect the interests of shareholders, by providing independent opinions on the various activities of the company and the executives. [@bib1] states that in the absence of a specific committee within a company\'s structure, it is like an executive writing a contract of agreement with the right hand then signing it with the left one. The establishment of specific committees are expected to improve the oversight and control of management, while remaining in line with the expectations and interests of shareholders. And, good control and management are expected to be associated with improved firm performance. Based on the regulation in Indonesia regarding the board of directors\' supporting committees, the most important committee to incentivize management to work effectively is the Remuneration Committee (RC).

In Indonesia, the RC serves to evaluate and provide recommendations regarding remuneration policies of the board of directors and executives. Prior to the introduction of the new edition of the Indonesian Corporate Governance Manual in 2018, establishment of RCs was only mandated for banking and financial companies. For other companies, the establishment of RCs was voluntary. However, even though it was voluntary, an increasing number of listed companies in Indonesia have been establishing RCs. Based on the Financial Services Authority Regulation 34/POJK.04/2014, companies that register on IDX are required to have Nomination and Remuneration Committee to improve the application of the principles of good corporate governance. In Indonesia, the establishment of a Nomination and Remuneration Committee has been recommended in the GCG General Guidelines ([@bib11]). Furthermore, the applicable capital market regulations encourage public companies to provide disclosures if they have Nomination and Remuneration Committee. In practice, there are 122 out of 494 (25%) Public Companies that have a Nomination and Remuneration Committee and disclose it in the annual report.

Remuneration of the board of directors and executives needs to be considered in corporate governance, because the level of remuneration must be designed in such a way as to be attractive enough to incentivize the board of directors and executives to run the company effectively. Thus, RCs play an important role in maintaining and controlling the board of directors and executives, where an effective RC can ensure that the remuneration structure (salary, honorarium, incentives, and allowances) of the board of directors and executives has been set to maximize performance, so that it will reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. Based on agency theory, the goals of shareholders and management must be harmonized. Thus, higher compensation rates will result in higher corporate performance in broadly diversified ownership companies ([@bib18]). [@bib15] also shows that CEO compensation is positively related to the firm performance in companies with low concentrated ownership structures. In order for managers to act in the company\'s long-term interests, it requires alignment of incentives among many managers ([@bib3]).

Prior research demonstrates that the existence of RCs in corporate governance structures can provide significant benefits to the company\'s risk level and increase the level of voluntary disclosure ([@bib21]; [@bib16]). [@bib13] find a positive relationship between remuneration committees and remuneration in Malaysia, which suggests the effectiveness of the committee in reducing agency problems and motivating managers to perform. The existence of RCs can educate top management in responding to risk incentive compensation. [@bib8] explained that CEOs respond to risk incentives from their remuneration by making risky investments (eg., R&D) but still mitigating their personal risks by increasing company liquidity. Furthermore, [@bib1] and [@bib2] show that, with the establishment of RCs, the committee can monitor and advise executive management on salary decisions that reduce agency costs and should ultimately lead to better performance.

This study specifically examines the relationships between RCs and executive and board of director remuneration, and firm performance in Indonesia, during a period of voluntary formation of RCs. In this study, remuneration is conceptualized as a motivational tool for directors and executives to improve company performance ([@bib23]). [@bib9] shows that an appropriate executive compensation structure can significantly affect firm performance. We believe that it is important to know if RCs are an effective corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia, before they are mandated on all listed companies.

The study predicts that companies with RCs will have more effective remuneration packages, in the form of higher remuneration for executives and board of directors. In addition, the existence of RCs is expected to provide senior company officers with effective remuneration that incentivizes them to maximize their performance and the performance of the company. To test these relationships, this study uses 847 observations of listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2014 to 2017.

We find that remuneration committees are positively related to the levels of executive remuneration and firm performance. In particular, further testing indicates that higher remuneration is only linked to higher performance in firms that have established a remuneration committee. These results indicate that remuneration committees play an important and effective role in setting the remuneration of senior company officers, which motivates these officers to perform effectively and is associated with higher firm performance.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section [2](#sec2){ref-type="sec"} contains the hypothesis development; Section [3](#sec3){ref-type="sec"} details the sample, variables and research models; Section [4](#sec4){ref-type="sec"} contains empirical analysis, including univariate and multivariate analysis and further testing; and Section [5](#sec5){ref-type="sec"} contains the conclusions of the study, including implications and suggestions for further research.

2. Hypotheses development {#sec2}
=========================

Based on agency theory, shareholders allow executives to manage business operations on their behalf ([@bib14]). However, in this setting a divergence of interests between shareholders and managers can occur. This conflict is usually known as the agency problem. [@bib14] stated that, in order to mitigate the agency problem, firms should improve remuneration and align it with executives\' and shareholders\' interests. Better remuneration helps maintain and motivate executives and managers to generate higher performance (MCCG 2007 revised).

RC is a committee whose duty is to support and advise the board of directors on remuneration, such as setting the salary, horrorarium, incentives, and allowances of the board of directors and executives to maximize performance. Furthermore, the committee will propose remuneration fairly based on the board of directors and executives abilities and performance as a form of appreciation and to maintain executives. [@bib13] find a significant positive relationship between remuneration committee and remuneration in Malaysia, which suggests the effectiveness of the committee. They argue that remuneration committees design remuneration without the influence of the board, as MCCG suggested. [@bib22] examine the relationship between executive compensation and company performance and also the impact of the remuneration and nomination committee (RNC) on executive compensation (EC) and company performance. Their results show that the role of the RNC could prevent overpayment in executive compensation (EC), thus the RNC could create an effective remuneration package. Thus, we predict that the existence of RCs is associated with more effective remuneration packages, in the form of higher remuneration for executives and boards of directors.H1RCs are positively related to executive and board of director remuneration.

The existence of RCs can also reduce the agency problem that may occur by designing remuneration in such a way, based on executives\' performance, to motivate the board of directors and executives to produce the best decisions that can have an impact on improving firm performance ([@bib7]). [@bib1] and [@bib2] show that with the establishment of the RCs, the committee will monitor and advise executive management on salary decisions that can reduce agency costs and ultimately lead to better performance. Thus, we predict that the existence of RCs can improve firm performance.H2RCs are positively related to firm performance.

3. Method {#sec3}
=========

3.1. Data and sample {#sec3.1}
--------------------

This study consists of all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2014--2017 period. We use panel data, which is a combination of time series and cross-sectional company data. Sources of data used in this study include company annual reports and the ORBIS database. After merging observations from these two sources of data, a total population of 2,920 firm-year observations were available. Then, the following sample selection criteria were applied. First, exclude all companies in the financial, insurance and real estate industries (SIC 6) because of the different nature of their financial statements. Second, exclude any observations with missing data for the main variables used in this study. This resulted in a final sample of 847 firm-year observations.

3.2. Variable definitions {#sec3.2}
-------------------------

The dependent variables in this study are remuneration and firm performance. The remuneration variables (REMUNERATION) are measured as follows: natural logarithm of all executives\' remuneration (REM_EXE), natural logarithm of all board of directors\' remuneration (REM_DIR), and natural logarithm of all executives\' and board of directors\' remuneration (REM_ALL). Firm performance (PERFORMANCE) is measured by Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin\'s Q (TOBINSQ) and Return on Equity (ROE). ROA is earnings before interest and taxes divided by the total book value of total assets. Tobin\'s Q is the market value of equity and book value of liabilities, all divided by total assets. ROE is net income divided by total equity.

The main independent variable used in this study is the presence of a remuneration committee (RC). This is measured using a dummy variable equal to "1" if the firm has a remuneration committee and "0" otherwise.

The control variables used in this study include firm size, firm age, leverage, growth, operating cash flows, fixed asset intensity, executive team and board of director size, independence of the board of directors, size of the audit committee and auditor type. These are consistent with prior research ([@bib1]; [@bib20]; [@bib19]; [@bib6]; [@bib5]; [@bib10]; [@bib12]) and are defined as follows: FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; FAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was established; LEV is total debt divided by total assets; GROWTH is the proportional change in sales; CAPINT is fixed assets divided by total assets; OCF is cash flows from operations divided by total assets; DIR is the total number of directors; EXE is the total number of executives; INDDIR is the percentage of independent directors on the board; AUDCOM is the total number of members of the audit committee; BIG4 is a dummy variable equal to "1" for firms audited by a big four auditor, and "0" otherwise. Definitions and measurements of all variables used in this study are presented in the [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}.Table 1Variable definitions.Table 1VariableDefinitionSourceRemuneration Variables:REM_EXENatural logarithm of all executives\' remunerationAnnual ReportREM_DIRNatural logarithm of all board of directors\' remunerationAnnual ReportREM_ALLNatural logarithm of all executives\' and board of directors\' remunerationAnnual ReportPerformance Variables:ROA\
TOBINSQ\
ROEReturn on Assets; Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of total assets\
Tobin\'s Q; Market value of equity and book value of all liabilities divided by total assets\
Return on Equity; Net income divided by total equityORBIS\
ORBIS\
ORBISRemuneration Committee Variable:RCThe existence of a Remuneration Committee; A dummy variable equal to"1″ if a firm has a RC, otherwise "0"Annual ReportControl Variables:DIRTotal number of directors on the boardAnnual ReportEXETotal number of executivesAnnual ReportINDDIRPercentage of independent directors on the boardAnnual ReportAUDCOMTotal members of the audit committeeAnnual ReportBIG4Big Four Auditor; A dummy variable equal to "1" if the firm is audited by a big four auditor, otherwise "0"Annual ReportGROWTHSales Growth; proportional change in salesORBISLEVLeverage; Total liabilities divided by total assetsORBISFSIZEFirm Size; Natural logarithm of total assetsORBISFAGECompany Age; Natural logarithm of total years since company establishmentORBISOCFCash Flow Ratio; operating cash flow divided by total assets at the beginning of yearORBISCAPINTCapital Intensity; fixed assets divided by total assetsORBIS

3.3. Methodology {#sec3.3}
----------------

This study uses ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with fixed year and industry effects to control for differences in economic conditions and industry characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The first model relates the level of executive, board of director and total remuneration to the existence of a remuneration committee. The second model relates measures of firm performance (ROA, TOBINSQ and ROE) to the existence of a remuneration committee. Based on our hypotheses, we expect the coefficients on RC to be positive in both models.$$\mathbf{REMUNERATIO}\mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} = \ \mathbf{\beta}_{0} + \mathbf{\beta}_{1}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{2}\mathbf{DI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{3}\mathbf{EX}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{4}\mathbf{INDDI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{5}\mathbf{AUDCO}\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{6}\mathbf{BIG}4_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{7}\mathbf{GROWT}\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{8}\mathbf{LE}\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{9}\mathbf{FSIZ}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{10}\mathbf{FAG}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{11}\mathbf{OC}\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{12}\mathbf{CAPIN}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{YEA}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{INDUSTR}\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\varepsilon}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}}\ $$$$\mathbf{PERFORMANC}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} = \ \mathbf{\beta}_{0} + \mathbf{\beta}_{1}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{2}\mathbf{DI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{3}\mathbf{EX}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{4}\mathbf{INDDI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{5}\mathbf{AUDCO}\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{6}\mathbf{BIG}4_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{7}\mathbf{GROWT}\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{8}\mathbf{LE}\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{9}\mathbf{FSIZ}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{10}\mathbf{FAG}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{11}\mathbf{OC}\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{12}\mathbf{CAPIN}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{YEA}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{INDUSTR}\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\varepsilon}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}}$$

4. Results and discussion {#sec4}
=========================

4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis {#sec4.1}
---------------------------------------------------

[Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} contains the distribution of the sample by year. Of the 847 observations, 346 are from firms with RCs, which is equal to 41 percent of the sample. The number of firms with RCs increases from 39 in 2014 to 108 in 2015, to 123 in 2016, and decreases to 76 in 2017.Table 2Sample distribution.Table 2YearNumber of firms with RCNumber of firms without RCTotal2014391541932015108164272201612313325620177650126Total346501847

[Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} shows descriptive statistics. The average total remuneration of executives and the board of directors is IDR 27, 500, 000,000. In the subsamples that report information on executive and board of director remuneration separately (n = 449), the average remuneration of executives is IDR 17, 860, 000,000 and the average remuneration of the board of directors is IDR 6,474, 000, 000. For the performance variables, the average firm has ROA of 4.928 percent, ROE of 4.665 percent and a Tobin\'s Q of 1.174. The average company has growth of 9.7%, leverage of 46.4%, total assets of IDR 6,922, 000, 000,000, fixed asset intensity of 55.2%, and operating cash flow of 7.1%. In addition, the average company has 4.376 directors, 4.875 executives, 37.795 percent of independent directors, audit committee size of 2.962 and is 41.7 percent likely to have a Big4 auditor.Table 3Summary statistics (n = 847).Table 3MeanMedianMinimumMaximumREM_EXE17,860,000,00010,340,000,00032,070,600179,800,000,000REM_DIR6,474,000,0002,650,000,00012,000,000165,500,000,000REM_ALL27,500,000,00012,070,000,00070,000,0001,193,000,000,000ROA4.9284.095-31.14047.920TOBINSQ1.1740.6050.04011.380ROE4.6655.755-98.63089.890RC0.4080.0000.0001.000DIR4.3764.0001.00022.000EXE4.8755.0002.00016.000INDDIR37.79533.3330.000300.000AUDCOM2.9623.0000.0006.000BIG40.4170.0000.0001.000GROWTH0.0970.039-0.8313.775LEV0.4640.4640.0400.906FSIZE6,922,000,000,0001,541,000,000,000161,000,00089,600,000,000,000FAGE3.3413.4661.7924.477OCF0.0710.060-0.1260.410CAPINT0.5520.5570.0750.958[^1]

[Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} shows the Pearson correlations between the variables. The correlations between RC and the remuneration variables are all positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with [Hypothesis 1](#enun_H1){ref-type="statement"}. The correlations between RC and the performance variables are all positive and significant at a minimum of the 5% level, consistent with [Hypothesis 2](#enun_H2){ref-type="statement"}.Table 4Pearson correlations.Table 4\[1\]\[2\]\[3\]\[4\]\[5\]\[6\]\[7\]\[8\]\[9\]\[10\]\[11\]\[12\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]\[16\]\[17\]\[18\]\[1\] REM_EXE1.000\[2\] REM_DIR0.707\*\*\*1.000(0.000)\[3\] REM_ALL0.969\*\*\*0.821\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)\[4\] ROA0.216\*\*\*0.097\*\*0.269\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.035)(0.000)\[5\] TOBINSQ0.098\*\*0.0350.119\*\*\*0.464\*\*\*1.000(0.031)(0.438)(0.000)(0.000)\[6\] ROE0.168\*\*\*0.126\*\*\*0.235\*\*\*0.849\*\*\*0.373\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.006)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)\[7\] RC0.375\*\*\*0.260\*\*\*0.326\*\*\*0.144\*\*\*0.137\*\*\*0.087\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.009)\[8\] DIR0.321\*\*\*0.402\*\*\*0.443\*\*\*0.133\*\*\*0.117\*\*\*0.150\*\*\*0.280\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)\[9\] EXE0.489\*\*\*0.363\*\*\*0.555\*\*\*0.180\*\*\*0.093\*\*\*0.142\*\*\*0.260\*\*\*0.443\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.005)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)\[10\] INDDIR0.0330.0590.068\*\*-0.088\*\*\*-0.116\*\*\*-0.0480.0440.0280.067\*\*1.000(0.475)(0.196)(0.041)(0.008)(0.000)(0.148)(0.187)(0.399)(0.044)\[11\] AUDCOM0.233\*\*\*0.202\*\*\*0.155\*\*\*0.065\*\*0.0030.056\*0.130\*\*\*0.187\*\*\*0.197\*\*\*0.077\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.049)(0.923)(0.089)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.019)\[12\] BIG40.372\*\*\*0.254\*\*\*0.414\*\*\*0.263\*\*\*0.139\*\*\*0.203\*\*\*0.199\*\*\*0.318\*\*\*0.338\*\*\*-0.0050.207\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.877)(0.000)\[13\] GROWTH-0.0240.037-0.0440.064\*0.068\*\*0.074\*\*-0.010-0.031-0.043-0.0260.019-0.0261.000(0.604)(0.419)(0.185)(0.052)(0.039)(0.025)(0.772)(0.344)(0.194)(0.427)(0.558)(0.440)\[14\] LEV0.0650.0650.085\*\*-0.228\*\*\*-0.169\*\*\*-0.107\*\*\*0.0470.0260.061\*0.067\*-0.004-0.024-0.0091.000(0.168)(0.168)(0.014)(0.000)(0.000)(0.002)(0.175)(0.452)(0.074)(0.052)(0.897)(0.477)(0.798)\[15\] FSIZE0.168\*\*\*0.165\*\*\*0.265\*\*\*0.055\*-0.0270.062\*0.080\*\*0.263\*\*\*0.281\*\*\*0.0230.119\*\*\*0.194\*\*\*-0.062\*0.144\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.098)(0.419)(0.061)(0.015)(0.000)(0.000)(0.485)(0.000)(0.000)(0.062)(0.000)\[16\] FAGE0.098\*\*0.0730.122\*\*\*0.141\*\*\*0.064\*0.123\*\*\*0.0020.180\*\*\*0.149\*\*\*-0.028-0.0050.116\*\*\*-0.058\*-0.054-0.081\*\*1.000(0.031)(0.109)(0.000)(0.000)(0.052)(0.000)(0.945)(0.000)(0.000)(0.397)(0.869)(0.000)(0.079)(0.119)(0.014)\[17\] OCF0.270\*\*\*0.117\*\*0.269\*\*\*0.576\*\*\*0.379\*\*\*0.451\*\*\*0.169\*\*\*0.167\*\*\*0.196\*\*\*-0.118\*\*\*0.079\*\*0.316\*\*\*-0.024-0.106\*\*\*0.104\*\*\*0.086\*\*\*1.000(0.000)(0.010)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.000)(0.017)(0.000)(0.471)(0.002)(0.002)(0.009)\[18\] CAPINT0.0380.0190.053-0.243\*\*\*-0.039-0.168\*\*\*0.116\*\*\*0.093\*\*\*0.061\*0.0160.077\*\*0.0140.0360.085\*\*0.162\*\*\*-0.196\*\*\*-0.0171.000(0.411)(0.677)(0.109)(0.000)(0.236)(0.000)(0.000)(0.005)(0.066)(0.627)(0.020)(0.668)(0.274)(0.013)(0.000)(0.000)(0.599)[^2]

[Table 5](#tbl5){ref-type="table"} provides some initial analysis of the differences between firms with and without remuneration committees. Results are presented for differences in means using t-tests and differences in medians using Wilcoxon z-tests. Consistent with [Hypothesis 1](#enun_H1){ref-type="statement"}, we find that firms with remuneration committees have higher total remuneration, higher executive remuneration and higher board of director remuneration. Also, consistent with our second hypothesis, we find that firms with RCs have higher performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin\'s Q). The results for the control variables also indicate that firms with RCs are larger in size, have greater operating cash flows, fixed assets intensity, have more executives and bigger board of directors, bigger audit committees and are more likely to hire a Big4 auditor. These are important differences, which we will control for in our multivariate analysis.Table 5Characteristics of firms with and without Remuneration Committees.Table 5Firms with RCFirms without RCt-valuez-valueN = 346N = 501REM_EXE23.47322.4398.839\*\*\*8.645\*\*\*REM_DIR22.04721.2975.878\*\*\*5.636\*\*\*REM_ALL23.63522.74410.386\*\*\*10.061\*\*\*ROA6.8603.5974.391\*\*\*5.253\*\*\*TOBINSQ1.4660.9734.157\*\*\*4.398\*\*\*ROE6.9373.1012.626\*\*\*4.660\*\*\*DIR5.0223.9318.793\*\*\*9.265\*\*\*EXE5.5034.4438.134\*\*\*7.648\*\*\*INDDIR38.61537.2311.3211.041AUDCOM3.0752.8833.949\*\*\*4.950\*\*\*BIG40.5350.3356.130\*\*\*6.010\*\*\*GROWTH0.0910.101-0.2892.359\*\*LEV0.4750.4561.3571.358FSIZE27.48126.9512.433\*\*4.637\*\*FAGE3.3423.3400.069-0.124OCF0.0890.0585.163\*\*\*4.909\*\*\*CAPINT0.5840.5293.512\*\*\*3.431\*\*\*[^3]

4.2. RCs and remuneration {#sec4.2}
-------------------------

To test the first hypothesis in this study, we relate the existence of a remuneration committee to the level of remuneration of executives and directors using model 1. [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"} shows the results of this analysis. In the first specification, the coefficient on RC is positive and significant (t = 2.03), indicating that the presence of a remuneration committee is associated with higher executive remuneration. In the second specification, the coefficient on RC is insignificant, indicating no relationship between remuneration committees and board of director remuneration. In the third specification, the coefficient on RC is also insignificant, indicating no relationship between remuneration committees and total remuneration. Thus, these results provide partial support for [Hypothesis 1](#enun_H1){ref-type="statement"}, in that the existence of remuneration committees is only linked to higher remuneration for executives. This result is consistent with research by [@bib13], who found a significant positive relationship between remuneration committees and remuneration in Malaysia, which indicated the effectiveness of the committee.Table 6Remuneration committees and executives and board of director remuneration.Table 6(1)(2)(3)REM_EXEREM_DIRREM_ALLRC0.221\*\*-0.0390.050(2.03)(-0.31)(0.72)DIR-0.0110.106\*\*\*0.027(-0.34)(3.61)(1.40)EXE0.164\*\*\*0.091\*\*\*0.152\*\*\*(5.52)(2.71)(7.74)INDDIR-0.0010.002-0.001(-0.23)(0.63)(-0.37)AUDCOM0.0440.067-0.061(0.56)(0.85)(-1.25)BIG40.221\*-0.0020.154\*(1.84)(-0.02)(1.87)GROWTH-0.1220.047-0.067(-1.13)(0.28)(-0.89)LEV-0.042-0.135-0.021(-0.17)(-0.47)(-0.13)FSIZE0.319\*\*\*0.375\*\*\*0.412\*\*\*(7.59)(7.05)(14.07)FAGE-0.006-0.0370.132\*(-0.06)(-0.34)(1.94)OCF1.738\*\*\*0.1871.462\*\*\*(2.91)(0.27)(3.89)CAPINT-0.572\*\*\*-0.931\*\*\*-0.558\*\*\*(-2.62)(-3.34)(-3.68)CONSTANT12.718\*\*\*9.591\*\*\*10.221\*\*\*(10.56)(6.56)(12.31)Year FEYesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.4620.3680.571*N*449449847[^4][^5]

The results for the control variables indicate that remuneration is higher in bigger firms, firms with higher operating cashflows, firm with lower capital intensity and firms with more executives. There is also some evidence that bigger and more independent boards of directors are associated with higher board of director remuneration.

4.3. RCs and performance {#sec4.3}
------------------------

To test the second hypothesis in this study, we relate the presence of remuneration committees to firm performance using model 2. [Table 7](#tbl7){ref-type="table"} displays these results. The first specification relates the presence of remuneration committees to firm performance in the form of Tobin\'s Q. The coefficient on RC is positive and significant (t = 4.26). The second specification uses ROA as the measure of firm performance, and we find a positive and significant coefficient (t = 2.25) on RC. In the third specification, using ROE as the measure of firm performance, we find that the coefficient on RC is insignificant. These first two results provide support for [Hypothesis 2](#enun_H2){ref-type="statement"}, indicating that the existence of a remuneration committee is associated with higher Tobin\'s Q and higher ROA. These results are consistent with [@bib1] and [@bib2], which show that with the establishment of a RC, the committee will monitor and advise executive management on salary decisions that can reduce agency costs and ultimately lead to better performance. Results for the control variables indicate that firm performance is positively related to firm size, operating cash flows and firm growth, and negatively related to leverage and capital intensity.Table 7Remuneration committees and firm performance.Table 7TOBINSQROAROE(1)(2)(3)RC0.435\*\*\*1.548\*\*0.040(4.26)(2.25)(0.03)DIR0.048-0.2510.154(1.39)(-1.26)(0.39)EXE0.0160.038-0.293(0.48)(0.22)(-0.78)INDDIR-0.008-0.016-0.009(-1.58)(-0.79)(-0.19)AUDCOM-0.0190.1980.438(-0.18)(0.51)(0.47)BIG40.0390.401-1.152(0.37)(0.63)(-0.76)GROWTH0.284\*1.682\*\*3.264\*\*(1.75)(2.04)(2.00)LEV-0.897\*\*\*-9.503\*\*\*-6.492(-2.66)(-6.12)(-1.52)FSIZE-0.0321.232\*\*\*2.568\*\*\*(-0.72)(4.58)(4.12)FAGE0.0600.4991.280(0.54)(0.79)(0.96)OCF6.630\*\*\*60.262\*\*\*95.426\*\*\*(5.73)(10.70)(9.07)CAPINT-0.264-12.602\*\*\*-15.207\*\*\*(-0.72)(-7.77)(-4.57)CONSTANT1.691-22.701\*\*\*-68.062\*\*\*(1.41)(-2.88)(-3.94)Year FE7YesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.2390.4840.310*N*847847847[^6][^7]

4.4. Further analysis {#sec4.4}
---------------------

The results presented above document positive associations between the presence of remuneration committees and remuneration and firm performance. However, we acknowledge that omitted variable bias is a concern as there are other potential factors outside of our research framework that could be influencing our reported results. To help alleviate this concern, we conduct some further analysis to more clearly identify the influence of remuneration committees on remuneration and firm performance. We use model 3 below to relate remuneration committees, remuneration and their interactive effect to firm performance.$$\mathbf{PERFORMANC}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} = \ \mathbf{\beta}_{0} + \mathbf{\beta}_{1}\mathbf{R}\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{2}\mathbf{REMUNERATIO}\mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{3}\mathbf{RC} \ast \mathbf{REMUNERATIO}\mathbf{N}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{4}\mathbf{DI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{5}\mathbf{EX}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{6}\mathbf{INDDI}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{7}\mathbf{AUDCO}\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{8}\mathbf{BIG}4_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{9}\mathbf{GROWT}\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{10}\mathbf{LE}\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{11}\mathbf{FSIZ}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{12}\mathbf{FAG}\mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{13}\mathbf{OC}\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\beta}_{14}\mathbf{CAPIN}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{YEA}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{INDUSTR}\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}} + \mathbf{\varepsilon}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{t}}$$

The results for model 3 are presented in [Table 8](#tbl8){ref-type="table"}. Tobins\' Q is used as the measure of firm performance is this analysis. In the first specification, we find a positive coefficient (t = 1.70) on RC\*REM_ALL, and an insignificant coefficient on REM_ALL. This positive coefficient on RC\*REM_ALL indicates that for firms with remuneration committees, higher remuneration of executives and directors is associated with higher firm performance. An indicator that companies that have a remuneration committee are creating effective remuneration packages that lead to higher firm performance.Table 8Remuneration committees, remuneration and firm performance.Table 8TOBINSQ(1)(2)(3)RC-3.457-8.780\*\*\*-6.885\*\*(-1.51)(-2.74)(-2.59)RC\*REM_ALL0.167\*(1.70)RC\*REM_EXE0.394\*\*\*(2.83)RC\*REM_DIR0.332\*\*\*(2.72)REM_ALL-0.059(-0.86)REM_EXE-0.022(-0.31)REM_DIR-0.088(-1.10)DIR0.0470.0760.063(1.39)(1.64)(1.40)EXE0.016-0.024-0.006(0.47)(-0.47)(-0.11)INDDIR-0.008-0.004-0.004(-1.54)(-0.73)(-0.75)AUDCOM-0.021-0.010-0.019(-0.19)(-0.06)(-0.11)BIG40.045-0.040-0.035(0.43)(-0.30)(-0.26)GROWTH0.289\*0.5230.503(1.78)(1.61)(1.54)LEV-0.872\*\*-0.641-0.626(-2.58)(-1.20)(-1.16)FSIZE-0.043-0.089-0.058(-0.69)(-1.47)(-0.87)FAGE0.060-0.167-0.184(0.54)(-1.14)(-1.25)OCF6.471\*\*\*6.385\*\*\*6.754\*\*\*(5.45)(3.73)(3.79)CAPINT-0.283-0.707-0.721(-0.75)(-1.48)(-1.45)CONSTANT3.355\*\*4.521\*\*5.183\*\*(2.23)(2.11)(2.23)Year FEYesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.2420.2800.273*N*847449449[^8][^9]

In the second and third specifications, we use executive and board of director remuneration separately (due to their high correlation as reported in [Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"}). We find negative coefficients (t = -2.74, -2.59) on RC and positive coefficients on RC\*REM_EXE (t = 2.83) and RC\*REM_DIR (t = 2.72). The coefficients on REM_EXE and REM_DIR are insignificant. The results of these interaction terms indicate that for firms with remuneration committees, higher executive remuneration and higher board of director remuneration are associated with higher firm performance. Thus, these results are stronger evidence that it is the combined effect of remuneration committees on remuneration packages that leads to higher firm performance. The results of this study are consistent with research by [@bib22], which shows that remuneration and nomination committees (RNCs) have a strong impact on company performance.

4.5. Robustness checking {#sec4.5}
------------------------

As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis with matched sample analysis using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). This analysis allows us to more cleanly compare the treatment group (remuneration committee group) to the control group (non-remuneration committee group). After the matching process, we have 743 firm-year observations in these two groups. Then, we re-run the regression to check whether the results from the main regression are robust when we use the matching sub-sample.

[Table 9](#tbl9){ref-type="table"} shows the results of the regressions of remuneration committees on remuneration. Consistent with the main findings, we find that remuneration committees are positively and significantly correlated to executive remuneration. We also do not find significant relationships between remuneration committees and both director and all (executive and director) remuneration.Table 9Remuneration committees and executive and board of director remuneration using a matched sample.Table 9(1)(2)(3)REM_EXEREM_DIRREM_ALLRC0.319\*\*-0.0230.081(2.57)(-0.16)(1.08)CONSTANT12.745\*\*\*8.942\*\*\*10.559\*\*\*(9.63)(5.45)(11.75)Control VariablesYesYesYesYear FEYesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.4160.3540.555*N*385385743[^10][^11]

Similar to the results in [Table 7](#tbl7){ref-type="table"}, the results in [Table 10](#tbl10){ref-type="table"} also provide evidence that the existence of remuneration committees is significantly positively related to firm performance. Specifically, to both Tobin\'s Q and ROA. We also do not find a significant association between remuneration committees and ROE.Table 10Remuneration committees and firm performance using a matched sample.Table 10TOBINSQROAROE(1)(2)(3)RC0.372\*\*\*1.652\*\*\*0.968(3.38)(2.61)(0.68)CONSTANT1.758-13.999\*\*-48.659\*\*\*(1.36)(-1.99)(-3.09)Control VariablesYesYesYesYear FEYesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.2300.5170.349*N*743743743[^12][^13]

Finally, we check the results in [Table 8](#tbl8){ref-type="table"} using our matched sub-sample (see [Table 11](#tbl11){ref-type="table"}). In general, the results are consistent with our main findings. Executive and director remuneration is only positively related to firm performance in firms with remuneration committees. Therefore, in summary, the results of our study are consistent in the full sample and the matched sample.Table 11Remuneration committees, remuneration and firm performance using a matched sample.Table 11TOBINSQ(1)(2)(3)RC-3.302-7.558\*\*-7.033\*\*\*(-1.28)(-2.26)(-2.70)RC\*REM_ALL0.158(1.42)RC\*REM_EXE0.335\*\*(2.31)RC\*REM_DIR0.335\*\*\*(2.78)REM_ALL-0.051(-0.67)REM_EXE0.035(0.52)REM_DIR-0.068(-0.82)CONSTANT3.153\*\*3.1814.576\*\*(1.96)(1.55)(2.05)Control VariablesYesYesYesYear FEYesYesYesIndustry FEYesYesYesr20.2330.2770.271*N*743385385[^14][^15]

5. Conclusions {#sec5}
==============

The most recent edition of the Indonesian Corporate Governance Manual, issued in June 2018, states that listed companies must establish a remuneration committee. This shift in focus from voluntary formation of board committees to mandatory formation is interesting, as little to no research has been conducted in Indonesia about the effectiveness of such committees. This study helps to address this issue by examining the role of the remuneration committee on the remuneration practices of senior company officers and its associated effect on firm performance.

The study predicts that companies with RCs will have more effective remuneration packages, in the form of higher remuneration for executives and board of directors. In addition, the existence of RCs is expected to provide senior company officers with effective remuneration that incentivizes them to maximize their performance and the performance of the company.

To test these relationships, this study uses 847 observations of listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 2014 to 2017. Our results indicate that RCs are positively related to the level of executive remuneration and firm performance. In particular, higher remuneration is only linked to higher performance in firms that have established a remuneration committee.

This study has implications for regulators and company management in Indonesia and other emerging markets, as the existence of remuneration committees is found to be associated with more effective remuneration packages and higher firm performance. However, since our research setting is in the scenario of voluntary formation of remuneration committees, it would be interesting for future research to investigate if the same results are found if companies are forced to establish such committees. It is possible that RCs are an optimal corporate governance structure for some, but not all listed companies in Indonesia and other developing markets.

This study can assist companies in maintaining corporate sustainability through the right remuneration scheme for directors and executives, and in evaluating the performance of remuneration committees. This research also contributes to the literature related to remuneration in Indonesia by providing evidence that clearly shows that the existence of remuneration committees is important in aligning the relationship between director and executive remuneration and firm performance.

Another avenue of future research is to further investigate the remuneration practices of board of directors and executives in Indonesia. In other markets, more detailed information is available about the specific components of remuneration and whether the components are fixed or variable consideration. We call on regulators and listed companies in Indonesia to disclose more details of their board of director and executive remuneration packages.
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[^1]: Notes: This table presents summary statistics for all the variables used in this study for the period 2014--2017. Values for REM_EXE, REM_DIR, REM_ALL and SIZE are presented as raw values and not natural logarithms.

[^2]: Notes: This table reports the Pearson Correlation test results with \*p \< 0,1, \*\*p \< 0,05, \*\*\*p \< 0,01, significant in 10%, 5%, and 1%.

[^3]: Notes: This table reports the characteristics of firms with RC and without RC. The t-test and z-test are displayed with \*t \> 1,645, \*\*t \> 1,960, \*\*\*t \> 2,326 and \*z \> 1,640 \*\*z \> 1,960 \*\*\*z \> 2,570, significant in 10%, 5%, and 1%.

[^4]: Notes: This table presents regression results testing the effect of RCs on executive remuneration (REM_EXE), board of director remuneration (REM_DIR), and total executive and board of director remuneration (REM_ALL). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^5]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.

[^6]: Notes: This table presents regression results testing the effect of RCs on firm performance (ROA, TOBINSQ and ROE). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^7]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.

[^8]: Notes: This table presents regression results testing the effect of RCs and executive remuneration (REM_EXE), board of director remuneration (REM_DIR), and total executive and board of director remuneration (REM_ALL) on firm performance (TOBINSQ). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^9]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.

[^10]: Notes: Using a Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) sub-sample, this table presents the results of models of RCs on executives\' remuneration (REM_EXE), board of directors\' remuneration (REM_DIR), and total executives\' and board of directors\' remuneration (REM_ALL). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^11]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.

[^12]: Notes: Using a Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) sub-sample, this table presents the results of models of RCs on firm performance (ROA, TOBINSQ and ROE). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^13]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.

[^14]: Notes: Using a Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) sub-sample, this table presents the results of models of RCs and executive remuneration (REM_EXE), board of director remuneration (REM_DIR), and total executive and board of director remuneration (REM_ALL) on firm performance (TOBINSQ). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed) respectively.

[^15]: \*p \< .1, \*\*p \< .05, \*\*\*p \< .01.
